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Significance for public health 
In the last years, the debate about the Affordable Care Act has been vigorous. For the first time, the 
US health system experienced a strong and revolutionary change with the introduction of a public 
programme into a previously totally private system. The debate about the consequences of this policy 
is open since the effects are unclear. The recent US presidential election proved the relevance of the 
debate. The analysis reported here is an attempt to add another piece to the puzzle, highlighting some 
critical aspects from  a different point of view in a field that is still controversial. 
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Abstract 
Background: Following the introduction of the Affordable Care Act, various studies have tried 
to identify the effects of the Reform, without reaching a clear consensus. The aim of this study was 
to investigate whether expansion of the Medicaid program has led to less inequality in access to health 
care and to a higher level of ex-ante moral hazard. 
Design and Methods: The analysis was conducted on two-year longitudinal data (2014-2015) 
regarding a cohort of 15,898 individuals from a Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). After a 
data cleaning procedure, a sample of 9,255 individuals was selected for the inequality part of the 
study and 2,307 for the ex-ante moral hazard analysis. Propensity score matching with nearest-
neighbour and kernel matching algorithms, difference-in-difference models and concentration index, 
corrected according to Erreygers methodology, were adopted.  
Results: The analysis showed that disparities were reduced between social classes although 
the ex-ante moral hazard is a real problem with the Affordable Care Act since individuals covered by 
public insurance tended to abuse the public service. Among those who benefited from the Act, a 
reduction in preventive behaviours was observed: there was an increase in smoking and a decrease in 
level of physical activity. As far as concerns access to health care, there was a decrease in inequality 
in emergency visits, inability to get care and getting care when needed among beneficiaries of the 
Reform.  
Conclusions: This study demonstrates that the extension of Medicaid has had a dual effect of 
reducing disparities in access to health care but, at the same time, it seems to have induced people to 
take less care of themselves. 
 
Introduction 
The concepts of ex-ante and ex-post activities are pillars of the health insurance market, being 
associated with the main risks for insurance coverage. According to health insurance models, having 
insurance coverage could undermine an individual’s attempt to conduct a healthy lifestyle and 
preventive activities. This phenomenon is called ex-ante moral hazard [1]. The ex-post moral hazard 
takes place after the loss of health has occurred. The consequence is an increment in health care use 
and/or sick leave [2].  
While ex-post moral hazard in the health insurance market has been widely investigated, the 
evidence about ex-ante moral hazard and analyses of inequalities resulting from the expansion of 
Medicaid are scant. Medicaid1 was introduced during President Lyndon Johnson’s mandate (1965), 
 
1 Medicaid, a public health insurance programme, was designed for all individuals and families with a low income and limited family 
resources. It is based at federal and state levels and so has its own rules and eligibility for patients according to the state. There are two 
possible ways to apply for Medicaid: through the Health Insurance Marketplace (HIM) or through the state Medicaid Agency. 
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but its reform started in March 2010, when the Affordable Care Act (ACA) – also known as 
‘Obamacare’ – was approved, with the final aims of improving access to health care, containing costs 
and reallocating expenditure.  
As a result of the implementation of the ACA in 2014, Medicaid was expanded to a larger 
proportion of the population. First, the poverty threshold was raised from 100% to 133% and a tax 
credit premium was introduced for all people whose salary lay between 133% and 400% of the 
poverty threshold. As a consequence, the threshold to be considered poor passed from $11,489 per-
subject per-year to $15,282$ after 2014. Secondly, employers with more than 50 employees were 
forced to supply insurance coverage; Thirdly, ‘cherry picking’ was forbidden and companies could 
not insure people based on their pre-existing conditions. According to the data for the sample of 
subjects that we studied,, the increase in the poverty threshold more than quadrupled the number of 
people considered poor (from 529 in 2014 to 2,307 in 2015). Although the ACA came into force in 
January 2014, its implementation was not obligatory and nineteen states decided not to adhere [3].  
Some authors have postulated that public insurance plans could lead to less inequality in health 
care access [4,5,6] but to a higher level of ex-ante moral hazard, because of negative behaviours in those 
US households that benefit from the Reform [7,8,9]. The roots of this hypothesis lie in the principle that 
health insurance removes the financial consequences of illness, since expenditure for insured 
individuals who need healthcare assistance is no longer sustained privately by the person requiring 
the assistance. Studies supporting this hypothesis have some limitations: Dave et al. (2006) concluded 
that having public health insurance reduces the personal preventive behaviours only among elderly 
individuals [10]; Spenkuch et al. (2012) focused on Mexican states, considering changes from the 
demand side, while keeping all the characteristics and constraints of the supply side fixed[7]. Sommers 
et al. (2016) performed their analysis only in three US states (Kentucky and Arkansans which adopted 
the ACA and Texas which did not)[11]. Other studies are controversial: Cotti et al. (2019) concluded 
that the number of smokers and cigarette consumption decreased after the Reform [8]; Countermanche 
et al. (2017) discovered that the impact of Medicaid expansion was positive in terms of insurance 
coverage and access to care, but without statistically significant proof of the consequent unhealthy 
behaviours [9]; Simon et al. (2017) found that reported health was improved by the expansion of 
Medicaid [12]. 
To the best of my knowledge, only two studies have focused on the impact of the ACA on 
socioeconomic inequalities in access to health care, showing a positive effect on access to health care, 
with greater equality in use of preventive services, quality of care and access to a doctor [4,5]. On the 
other hand, the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment suggested that the expansion of Medicaid did 
not have strong positive effects on reducing inequalities [13, 14]. 
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On the background of the lack of a common consensus in this field, the aim of this study was 
to shed light on the effects (drawbacks and aftermath) of the ACA on personal behaviours and 
possible inequalities in access to health care. Unlike previous studies, the analysis was performed on 
a heterogeneous dataset representative of the whole USA.  
 
Design and Methods 
This project started in October 2019. Two-year longitudinal data, derived from responses to 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)2 were analysed. Each MEPS panel is a subsample of 
the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), with enrichment of information from low-income 
households. The MEPS provides information about expenditures, payments, different insurance plans 
and healthcare use, demographics, socioeconomic status, self-reported health and health care access. 
The period under investigation was between 2014 and 2015. The two-year period was selected 
because the MEPS provides information on a two-yearly basis and no comparison between panels is 
possible because of anonymization of data. The initial dataset contained records for 15,898 
individuals; 92.1% of the respondents’ information was available for both years and in the remaining 
7.9% of cases only for one year due to death, birth or the person left the country.  
After the data cleaning procedure, including elimination of individuals for whom complete, 
two-year information was not available, and through an interaction between the poverty threshold 
and total personal income, a balanced dataset3, was derived. All household members aged below 18 
and above 65 years were excluded, since the former are eligible for other government health insurance 
programs (CHIP) and the Medicare program covers the latter. Finally, data from a sample of 9,255 
individuals were selected for the inequality part of the study and data from 2,307 individuals were 
used for the behavioural analysis. Since no information about the state of provenience was available, 
individuals who did not have Medicaid insurance in 2014, but who were receiving public healthcare 
coverage in 2015 after the rise in the upper limit to define poverty, were assumed to come from those 
states adhering to the new “Obamacare” policy (https://www.healthcare.gov/.).  
The variables considered in our analysis are reported in Table 1: Race represents a dummy 
variable which distinguished between white individuals and different minorities, grouped together; 
Married identifies whether the individual under observation was married or not in 2014 and/or 2015; 
Years of education4 was assigned the value of zero if the individual had no education or, anyway, less 
then primary school level, then the score increased progressively; Unemployment identifies 
 
2MEPS data started to be collected in 1996 and they are provided by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).  
3Characterized by the absence of missing values and the satisfaction of unbalanced conditions. 
4The discrimination between high and low level of education was provided by Armstrong et al. (2014): below high school education, 
individuals are considered to have a low level of education. Thus, two dummy variables were generated for high and low level of 
education. 
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individuals without a job or the possibility of returning to work within the year of investigation; Blood 
control, Breast exam, Check-up, Obesity, Junk and fat food eating, Low level of physical exercise, 
Smoking, Stroke, Heart attack, and High cholesterol level are binary variables indicating specific 
behaviours, preventive and not, which an individual may adopt; Self-assessed health5 is a categorical 
variable with a score ranging from 1 to 5; Total personal income and Total family income captures 
the individual’s and family’s income, respectively, in 2014 and 2015; Medicaid insurance, Private 
insurance and Uninsured are variables that document the type of insurance that the the subject had 
or whether the individual did not have insurance coverage.  
The analysis was performed in different steps. First, probit models were run to understand 
whether or not individual behaviours (i.e. preventive behaviours, check-up, obesity6, smoking, health 
condition7 and low level of exercise) were influenced by demographic and social variables. The probit 
non-linear regression model was necessary as a first step to investigate the probability with which an 
individual may or may not develop a specific behaviour (i.e., the dichotomous dependent variable). 
Probit models were conceived for the analysis of individual choices since individuals often make 
choices between two distinct alternatives. The interpretation of probit coefficients was essential to 
understand how the probability of adopting a specific behaviour varies. In probit models, the marginal 
effects, reported in Table 2, vary with the characteristics of the individuals. Based on the signs and 
significance of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables, it is possible to establish the 
effect on personal behaviours.  
However, probit models cannot provide any information on the magnitude of policy effects. 
Thus, once those behaviours on which it was possible to observe an impact of the ACA had been 
identified, the second step of the analysis aimed to define how and how much the expansion of 
Medicaid resulted in negative behaviours in an individual and the change in ex-ante moral hazard 
(i.e. preventive behaviours, smoking and low level of physical activity). For this purpose, Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) and Difference-in-Difference (DID) models were run.  
PSM reduces distortion, solving the problem of bias generated by confounding variables, and 
avoids problems of endogeneity8, through the adoption of a double-robust approach by combining 
the regression analysis and propensity score[16]. PSM is intended to obtain pairing of cases and 
controls under randomization. The propensity score can be defined as the conditional probability of 
 
5Where 1=excellent health, 2=very good health, 3=good health, 4=fair health, 5=poor health. This means that the unitary marginal 
increment of Self-Assessed Health moves from a better condition to a worse one. 
 
6This is calculated according to the Body-Mass Index (BMI) whose threshold for discriminating obese individuals is based on the 
international Body-Mass Index thresholds published by the NHS: for values above 30, the subject is considered obese. 
7This variable expresses a series of negative health conditions: heart problems, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, 
asthma, arthritis and cancer. 
8Patients may adopt some specific behaviours because of lower income or their own individual characteristics. 
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having experienced the Medicaid expansion, given all the observed demographic and social 
characteristics, which may determine the selection, in a region of common support9[17, 18]. Once the 
propensity score is computed, the process of matching, adopting nearest-neighbour and kernel 
matching algorithms, is provided by the so-called ‘statistical twins’ procedure, which is able to solve 
the problem of self-selection [19, 20]. In detail, the algorithm provides ‘statistical twins’ that differ only 
for having or not having Medicaid coverage. Subsequently, the Average Treatment Effect of Treated 
(ATET) is computed for the two groups in order to understand the average impact of the ACA on 
personal behaviours [21]. 
After determining the average effect of the policy, the DID approach was used to identify the 
true effect of the changing condition (treated vs. control) of Medicaid coverage, based on household 
income, before and after the expansion resulting from the ACA10[22, 23]. The control group consisted 
of individuals not covered by the expansion of Medicaid, whereas the treatment group was formed 
by individuals who became beneficiaries of the ACA Reform. Of note, necessary and sufficient 
conditions11for the implementation of DID were respected[24]. In detail, it is reasonable to suppose 
that if in 2014 there had not been the Medicaid Reform, people would have not changed their personal 
behaviours. Thus, the DID (or ‘double difference’) estimator could be defined as the difference in 
average outcome in the treatment group before and after treatment minus the difference in average 
outcome in the control group before and after treatment [22].  
The last step of the analysis, focused on the effects of the ACA in terms of healthcare access, 
was carried out using the concentration index methodology [25, 26]. The aim of this analysis was to 
establish whether the ACA had a positive or negative effect in terms of degree of inequalities among 
US citizens, including very poor and rich people (9,255 individuals). Attention was focused on the 
gaps generated by the Reforms on health care access and the possibility of prevention (i.e., prevention, 
outpatients’ visits, getting care when needed, inability to get care and emergency visits). Inequalities 
related to socioeconomic status are rank-based measures. Since indicators for healthcare access are 
dummy variables, Erreygers (2009) suggested a correction of the base index version [27], which is able 
to compute inequality in healthcare access [28]. Healthcare access and services can be represented as 
a function of a person’s need for healthcare, the predisposition to use healthcare services and factors 
that enable or prevent the usage.  
 
 
 
9Matching procedures try to select, from the non-treated individuals, a group of controls in which the distribution of observed variables 
is as similar as possible to the distribution in the treated group. In other words, for any confounding variable value, both in treatment 
and control groups, a unit i can be observed 
102014 is the pre-treatment period and 2015 indicates the post-treatment one. 
11 Similar dimension of groups, parallel trend assumptions and absence of systematic composition changes within each group. 
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Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the low-income group (i.e., 2,307 individuals) and 
the whole sample. Individuals covered by Medicaid were more frequently younger and female (67%) 
and their mean years of education after primary school was less than four. According to the 
methodology of Armstrong et al. (2014), these individuals are categorized as having a low level of 
education. In our sample, such individuals accounted for nearly one-third (n=645 subjects, 28%) of 
the whole cohort. It is supposed that individuals with a lower level of educations are likely to have 
lower salaries, and therefore, are less likely to buy out-of-pocket insurance.  
About 9% of the subjects with Medicaid insurance were married. With regard to ethnicity 
(White, 62%; Black 26%; Asian 7%; multiple ethnic groups 5%), Medicaid was extended to 185 new 
White subjects and 115 individuals from different ethnic groups.   
In line with MEPS data, between 2014 and 2015, the number of unemployed decreased (from 
1,695 to 1,597) and the percentage of insured increased in both the private and public sectors. 
According to the data, the number of individuals considered very poor and covered by Medicaid 
increased from 736 (31.9% of all individuals) in 2014 to 899 (39%) in 2015. The problem of not 
knowing from which state each individual came from was overcome by considering individuals not 
covered in 2014 and 2015 to belonging to those states not adopting the ACA. Among the 2,307 
individuals, 736 were insured before and after the Reform, 1,271 were uninsured before and after the 
Reform (i.e. the control group); and 300 subjects (13%), with the increase in the poverty threshold, 
gained Medicaid insurance (i.e. the treated group). It is worth noting that 18 individuals in the treated 
group (i.e. about 6% of this group) became smokers after the ACA came into force, 42 (14%) stopped 
physical activity, and 26 (9%) stopped taking care of themselves through the adoption of preventive 
behaviours.  
When comparing the inequality sample (9,255 subjects) with the group of individuals with a 
low income, the average age, the percentage of married individuals (10% increase) and the average 
years of education (about 5 years after the end of primary school) were higher in the former group.  
As expected, low-income individuals were more frequently covered by Medicaid or uninsured 
and less frequently owned private insurance. Furthermore, the average personal income in the low-
income group was ten times less than that of the whole sample and the average family income was 
almost half.  
As reported in Table 2, probit models showed a positive relationship between age and personal 
behaviours. In detail, between the two years of the Medicaid expansion, older people used more 
prevention, had more check-ups, had worse health conditions, were more frequently obese, performed 
less physical exercise and smoked less. Males did less prevention and had fewer periodic check-ups, 
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with changes between the two years from about 4% to 9% and from about 11% to 14%, respectively. 
Males had fewer physical problems thanks to higher levels of physical activity. They were also less 
frequently obese and smokers so they suffered fewer negative health conditions. Ethnicity played a 
key role (p-value < 0.001) for all the behaviours (i.e. obesity, smoking, check-up, health conditions 
and low level of physical activity) taken into account except for preventive behaviours. Having a low 
level of education had a negative impact in terms of obesity, smoking, low level of physical activity 
and health conditions. In other words, with a higher level of education the prevalence of smokers 
decreased, individuals were less obese, exercised more and suffered less from negative health 
conditions. Unemployment showed significant positive correlations with prevention and check-ups, 
negative correlations with smoking, physical activity and health conditions, and only a negative trend 
for obesity. In all cases self-assessed health was significant (p-value <0.001), with a positive effect at 
the margin with preventive behaviours, check-ups, low level of physical activity, the incidence of 
obesity, smoking prevalence and negative health conditions for worse reported health. The Obama 
Reform (ACA) had a significant impact at the margin in terms of preventive behaviours, smoking 
and low level of physical activity. According to the results of this study it can be inferred that having 
Medicaid coverage generates a reduction of prevention, increasing the negative behaviours of 
smoking and a sedentary life.  
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the PSM procedure, showing data before and 
after the matching procedure. Despite the limited time horizon, PSM (Table 3) demonstrated that the 
ACA had strong effects on personal negative behaviours in the sample of low-level individuals. The 
Reform resulted in an approximately 8% increase in smokers, 12.5% reduction in physical activity 
and 4.3% decrease in individuals who used prevention.  
These results were also highlighted with the DID approach (Table 4), although the impact 
with this model was weaker. As shown in the table, the expansion of Medicaid led to an increment in 
negative behaviours: 1,5% and 4,9% increases for smoking and low level of physical activity and a 
1% reduction in the proactive behaviour of taking care of oneself (p < 0.10). 
Table 5 reports the results of the inequality analysis. Medicaid increased disparities in 
preventive activities in favour of rich people (from 6.7% to 8%), in other words the gap between rich 
and poor individuals got larger between the two years. Outpatient visits, although not significant, 
remained stable over the two years (0.1%). Following the ACA Reform, disparities in Emergency 
visits increased, in favour of poor people, with an increment of 1.2%, which means that poor 
individuals are more protected in the case of emergencies, rather than in the case of prevention or 
regular check-ups. The disparity in inability to get care when needed, which was greater among poor 
people in 2014, decreased slightly between 2014 and 2015 (0.3%). Finally, the ability of individuals 
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to get care when needed had a pro-rich distribution, in line with the expectations, since it is the reverse 
of the previous variable. Anyway, in this case the improvement among the poor was greater (2.8%).  
 
Discussion  
The aim of the study was to investigate the possible drawbacks and aftermath of the Medicaid 
Reform in terms of higher levels of ex-ante moral hazard and possible reduction of inequalities, given 
that the economic literature focusing on this field is limited and controversial.  
Descriptive statistics of the low-income sample (i.e., 2,307 subjects), proved that individuals 
covered by Medicaid are more frequently younger and female, probably due to socioeconomic 
drivers. As already reported by Blau and Kahan (2006) and Angelov et al. (2016) these individuals 
have lower incomes because they are at the beginning of their career or because of the gender gap 
and, consequently, it is more likely for them to end up below the poverty threshold [29, 30]. By contrast, 
there were few married individuals in this group, probably because the increase of income in a family 
reduces the possibility of obtaining public insurance coverage [31, 32]. In line with MEPS data, between 
2014 and 2015, the number of unemployed decreased (from 1,695 to 1,597) and the percentage of 
insured increased in both the private and public sectors (from 31.9% to 39%). As expected in the 
inequality sample (9,255 subjects), on average, individuals were older, more frequently married and 
had a higher level of education than low-income individuals. Among the 2,307 subjects in the low-
income group, 736 individuals were insured before and after the Reform, 1,271 were uninsured before 
and after the Reform (i.e. the control group); and 300 subjects (13%) gained Medicaid insurance after 
the increase of the poverty threshold (i.e. treated group). 
Through probit models, the ex-ante moral hazard was confirmed for prevention, smoking and 
low level of physical activity. Thus, from a general perspective older people, suffering from more 
physical problems, use more prevention and young individuals tend to smoke more for social 
acceptance [33] and because of a more stressful life [34]. In line with literature, race and gender had an 
impact in terms of prevention and personal behaviours. Ethnicity played a key role (p-value < 0.001) 
in all cases but prevention. The main explanation can be provided by the intrinsic characteristics of 
individuals. According to Cossrow and Falkner (2004), in recent years there has been an increase in 
obesity among African-Americans and Hispanic/Mexican-Americans rather than Caucasian [35]; 
moreover, Giga et al. (2008) noted that all non-Caucasian individuals face fewer employment 
opportunities with the direct consequences of some negative personal behaviours [36]. Furthermore, 
individual lifestyles may generate some racial disparities (e.g. physical exercise ensures the 
possibility of obtaining social and educational results and incentives). In detail, Egli et al. (2011) 
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studied these differences in college students and concluded that race differences provided significant 
differences in eight of 14 exercise motivations [37]. 
Higher levels of education had a positive impact on prevention and personal behaviours. This 
result confirms the analyses of Feinstein et al. (2006) and Fonseca et al. (2019), who concluded that 
more years of education lead to a higher level of health, with more years of schooling being associated 
with a reduction in reported poor health [38, 39]. Unemployment reduced negative health conditions 
and increased the level of physical activity. The former effect could be explained by the characteristics 
of the sample: younger individuals have a higher probability both of being unemployed and of being 
in good health. The latter effect could be explained by the availability of  more free time. Self-assessed 
health was in line with expectations: a lower level of reported health and higher level of prevention 
are observed more frequently in people with more negative health conditions and behaviours. In fact, 
individuals who feel worse tend to adopt more proactive behaviours to change their negative 
condition and, at the same time, they represent that part of the population in a disadvantaged health 
state. Finally, having Medicaid coverage generated a reduction of prevention and increased negative 
behaviours such as smoking and a sedentary lifestyle. This is in line with literature: individuals 
covered by public insurance, relieved of personal expenditure on health, tend to abuse the public 
service, acquiring some negative behaviours (i.e. ex-ante moral hazard) [4,6].  
Probit models cannot provide any information regarding the magnitude of an individual’s 
negative behaviours and changes in ex-ante moral hazard after implementation of a new policy. Thus, 
adopting PSM and DID methodologies, a second analysis was conducted on those behaviours for 
which the ACA had been seen to have an impact (i.e. preventive behaviours, smoking and low level 
of physical activity). Despite the limited time horizon, in the sample of low-income individuals, PSM 
demonstrated that the Medicaid expansion had strong negative effects on personal behaviours, with 
an increase of smokers, and reductions in physical activity and prevention. Importantly, smoking and 
physical exercise are two behaviours that people can change immediately. Therefore, the PSM 
procedure was able to capture (p < 0.05) the proactive negative behaviour and the reduction in 
prevention. These results were confirmed by the application of DID.  
Finally, the concentration index was used to evaluate any inequalities generated by the 
Reforms on access to healthcare and the possibility of prevention (i.e. prevention, outpatient visits, 
getting care when needed, inability to get care and emergency visits). Differently from Kino and 
Kawachi (2018), in this study, Medicaid coverage increased disparities in preventive behaviours in 
favour of rich people, due to the fact that implementation of the ACA increased both the demand and 
supply sides [5]. Garthwaite (2012) proved that as public programmes increased the number of 
individuals with health insurance, the number of hours of assistance spent with a single patient 
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decreased [40]. Consequently, rich people, taking advantages of their private plans, may benefit from 
the healthcare system more than poor individuals. By contrast, when dealing with emergency visits, 
the ACA favoured poor people, protecting them better in the case of emergencies. Reductions in 
disparities were also observed when the inability to get care when needed and getting care when 
needed, were considered. Although Medicaid should reduce disparities, improving the healthcare 
status of poor individuals, the concentration index demonstrated an increase of benefits in daily and 
normal care even for rich people, because of spill over and indirect effects. 
 
Conclusions 
The final aim of the ACA – also known as ‘Obamacare’ – was to improve access to health 
care and to increase the number of individuals covered by public insurance.  
Through the analysis of two-year longitudinal data (2014 - 2015) provided by the MEPS and 
the implementation of econometric strategies (probit models, PSM, DID models and the 
concentration index), I observed thatt the ACA had a dual effect: on the one hand, personal negative 
behaviours increased, specifically less prevention, more smoking and lower levels of physical 
activity; on the other hand, disparities were reduced in the case of emergency care with indirect 
benefits in daily and normal care also for rich individuals.  
In conclusion, the ACA produced a paradox: the pursuit of better healthcare leads individuals 
to take less care of themselves 
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Figure 1. Distribution of individuals (treated vs not-treated) before and after the propensity 
score matching procedure. 
A. Smoking  
 
B. Low Level of Physical Activity  
 
C. Preventive Behaviours 
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Table 1. Variables, Mean and Standard Deviation of low-income individuals and whole US 
sample – 2014 and 2015. 
 
 Low-income individuals  Whole US sample 
 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev  
Age 35.5722 14.4258 36.5722 14.4258 40.1844 13.2567 41.1844 13.2567  
Sex 0.3303 0.4704 0.3303 0.4704 0.4708 0.4992 0.4708 0.4992  
Race 0.6242 0.4844 0.6242 0.4844 0.6674 0.4712 0.6674 0.4712  
Married 0.3424 0.4746 0.35215 0.4776 0.4629 0.4986 0.4736 0.4993  
Years of Education 3.7642 2.0121 3.7642 2.0121 4.8567 2.3947 4.8567 2.3947  
Unemployment 0.7350 0.4414 0.6922 0.4617 0.2922 0.4548 0.2886 0.4531  
          
Blood Control 0.7282 0.4450 0. 7152 0.4514 0.7431 0.4370 0.7051 0.4385  
Breast Exam 0.3026 0.4595 0.3108 0.4629 0.2790 0.4485 0.2824 0.4502  
Check Up 0.6030 0.4894 0.5961 0.4908 0.6001 0.4899 0.6159 0.4864  
Obesity 0.3237 0.4680 0.3213 0.4670 0.3231 0.4667 0.3316 0.4708  
Junk and Fat food 
Eating 0.2744 0.4463 0.3130 0.4638 0.3059 0.4608 0.3335 0.4715  
Low level Physical 
Exercise 0.3658 0.4818 0.4109 0.4921 0.3922 0.4827 0.4217 0.4939  
Smoking 0.0997 0.2997 0.0863 0.2808 0.0735 0.2609 0.0727 0.2597  
Stroke 0.0269 0.1618 0.0325 0.1774 0.0213 0.1447 0.0216 0.1560  
Heart Attack 0.0212 0.1442 0.0256 0.1579 0.0184 0.1343 0.0216 0.1454  
High Cholesterol 
Level 0.1964 0.3973 0.2172 0.4124 0.2228 0.4161 0.2460 0.4307  
Self-Assessed 
Health 2.5067 1.1781 2.5267 1.1317 2.3407 1.0555 2.3412 1.0407  
          
Total Personal 
Income 3168.248 3786.913 4679.147 4958.745 31268.03 35171.14 32806.87 35652.18  
Total Family 
Income 39225.84 46826.14 40677.20 46558.95 63040.5 57794.99 65105.43 58784.02  
          
Medicaid 
Insurance 0.3191 0.4662 0.3897 0.4878 0.1498 0.3569 0.1921 0.3940  
Private Insurance 0.2679 0.4430 0.3016 0.4591 0.5213 0.4996 0.5679 0.4954  
Uninsured 0.2618 0.4397 0.2280 0.4196 0.1957 0.3967 0.1655 0.3717  
Individuals 2,307 2,307 9,255 9,255  
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Table 2. Probit models marginal effect results. 
 2014 2015 
A. Preventive Behaviours Coeff. Std.Err.  Coeff. Std.Err.  
Age 0.0021 0.0007 *** 0.0042 0.0006 *** 
Sex - 0.0364 0.0204 * - 0.0873 0.0195 *** 
Race  0.0096 0.0200  0.0165 0.0193  
High Education 0.0197 0.0202  0.0326 0.0196 * 
Unemployment 0.0405 0.0216 * 0.0044 0.0201  
Self-Assessed-Health 0.0370 0.0089 *** 0.0443 0.0089 *** 
ACA - 0.0565 0.0291 ** - 0.0301 0.0290 * 
      
B. Check-Up Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff. Std.Err  
Age 0.0028 0.0007 *** 0.0040 0.0007 *** 
Sex - 0.1083 0.0198 *** - 0.1438 0.0193 *** 
Race  - 0.4954 0.0199 ** - 0.0444 0.0196 ** 
High Education 0.0137 0.0201  0.0443 0.0196 ** 
Unemployment 0.0720 0.0213 ** 0.0363 0.0208 * 
Self-Assessed-Health 0.0589 0.0086 *** 0.0689 0.0089 *** 
ACA 0.0243 0.0297  - 0.0026 0.0286  
      
C. Obesity Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff. Std.Err  
Age 0.0011 0.0007  0.0007 0.0007  
Sex - 0.1213 0.0200 *** - 0.1296 0.0198 *** 
Race  - 0.0582 0.0190 ** - 0.0273 0.0192  
High Education - 0.0760 0.0196 *** - 0.0491 0.0196 ** 
Unemployment - 0.0090 0.0207  - 0.0276 0.0206  
Self-Assessed-Health 0.0438 0.0090 *** 0.0477 0.0090 *** 
ACA 0.0211 0.0281  - 0.0035 0.0284  
    
D. Smoking Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff. Std.Err  
Age - 0.0003 0.0005  - 0.0011 0.0004 ** 
Sex - 0.0599 0.0139 *** - 0.0474 0.0131 *** 
Race  - 0.0272 0.0122 ** - 0.0473 0.0117 *** 
High Education - 0.0453 0.0122 ** - 0.0584 0.0129 *** 
Unemployment - 0.0405 0.0132 ** - 0.0212 0.0122 * 
Self-Assessed-Health 0.0217 0.0059 *** 0.0232 0.0059 *** 
ACA 0.0410 0.0179 ** 0.0505 0.0168 ** 
       
E. Health Conditions Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff. Std.Err  
Age 0.0092 0.0006 *** 0.0093 0.0006 *** 
Sex - 0.0976 0.0179 *** - 0.0911 0.0181 *** 
Race  - 0.1066 0.0167 *** - 0.1060 0.0172 *** 
High Education - 0.1396 0.0171 *** - 0.1315 0.0176 *** 
Unemployment - 0.1146 0.0182 *** - 0.0781 0.0192 *** 
Self-Assessed-Health 0.0520 0.0079 *** 0.0480 0.0086 *** 
ACA - 0.1147 0.0182  - 0.0247 0.0266  
       
F. Low level of Physical 
Activity  Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff. Std.Err  
Age 0.0026 0.0007 *** 0.0023 0.0007 ** 
18 
 
Sex - 0.1812 0.0195 *** - 0.2031 0.0193 *** 
Race  - 0.0562 0.0193 ** - 0.0228 0.0193  
High Education - 0.0513 0.0193 ** - 0.0329 0.0201 * 
Unemployment - 0.0642 0.0208 ** - 0.0272 0.0214  
Self-Assessed-Health 0.0586 0.0086 *** 0.0618 0.0092 *** 
ACA 0.0716 0.0290 ** 0.0741 0.0291 ** 
      
Number of individuals: 2,307 
Note: *** indicates p <0.001, ** indicates p <0.05 and * indicates p <0.1 
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Table 3. Propensity score matching for preventive behaviours, smoking and low level of 
physical activity. 
 
 Nearest-Neighbour  Kernel 
Preventive 
Behaviour 
Smoking  Low level 
of Physical 
Activity 
 Preventive 
Behaviour 
Smoking  Low level 
of Physical 
Activity 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect  
on the 
Treated 
(ATET) 
- 0.061 
(0.040) 
* 
0.077 
(0.037) 
*** 
0.109 
(0.060) 
*** 
 
- 0.043 
(0.033) 
** 
0.080 
(0.012) 
*** 
0. 125 
(0.029) 
*** 
Number of individuals: 2,307 
 *** indicates p <0.001, ** indicates p <0.05 and * indicates p <0.1 – Robust Standard Errors between parentheses 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mean in Control and Treatment groups and difference between Treatment and 
Control in preventive behaviours, smoking and low level of physical activity. 
 Preventive 
Behaviours Smoking  
Low level of Physical 
Activity 
Before 
Control (C) 
Treated (T) 
Diff (T-C) 
 
0.394 
0.543 
0.149 
(0.021) 
*** 
 
- 0.055 
0.002 
0.057 
(0.015) 
*** 
 
- 0.094 
- 0.067 
0.027 
(0.021) 
 
After 
Control (C) 
Treated (T) 
Diff (T-C) 
 
0.400 
0.538 
0.138 
(0.020) 
*** 
 
- 0.083 
0.010 
0.072 
(0.013) 
*** 
 
- 0.077 
0.002 
0.076 
(0.020) 
*** 
Difference-in-Difference 
(DID) 
- 0.010 
(0.028) 
* 
0.015 
(0.019) 
** 
0.049 
(0.028) 
* 
Number of individuals: 2,307 
*** indicates p <0.001, ** indicates p <0.05 and * indicates p <0.1 – Robust Standard Errors between parentheses 
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Table 5. Concentration indexes with Erreygers correction relative to 2014 and 2015 in 
healthcare access. 
 
 Preventive 
Behaviours 
Outpatient 
Visits 
Emergency 
Visits 
Inability to 
Get Care 
Got Care When 
Needed 
2014 
0.067 
(0.042) 
* 
0.010 
(0.013) 
- 0.071 
(0.020) 
* 
- 0.023 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.139 
(0.008) 
*** 
2015 
0.080 
(0.029) 
* 
0.011 
(0.014) 
- 0.083 
(0.018) 
** 
- 0.020 
(0.006) 
* 
0.111 
(0.150) 
*** 
Number of individuals: 9,255 
*** indicates p<0.001, ** indicates p <0.05 and * indicates p<0.1 – Robust Standard Errors 
between parentheses 
 
 
